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STATEMENT OF JURISIDICTION 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(j). The 
Utah Supreme Court transferred this matter to this Court pursuant to an order dated 
November 16, 2011 and filed on November 17, 2011. [R. 946-47.] 
ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND PRESERVATION 
Issue for Review: Plaintiff Neil Breton was the trustee of a Trust. In February 
2005, Plaintiff made the decision to pay off twelve of the Trust beneficiaries in exchange 
for releases. Plaintiff made this decision with full knowledge that the remaining three 
beneficiaries (the "Slater Brothers"), with whom Plaintiff had had a bitter and litigious 
history, were still free to sue him. Plaintiff claims that eliminating the twelve "releasing 
beneficiaries" gave the Slater Brothers an economic incentive to sue Plaintiff for 
mismanagement of the Trust. Plaintiff further claims the Slater Brothers' lawsuit caused 
him damages in the form of attorneys' fees and settlement sums paid to the Slater 
Brothers. Plaintiff now blames Defendants for creating the alleged economic incentive 
even though Plaintiff is the one who knowingly paid off the other twelve beneficiaries. 
The Slater Brothers all testified that the alleged economic incentive played no role in 
their decision to sue Plaintiff, and there is no evidence to suggest that the Slater Brothers 
would not have sued Plaintiff without the alleged economic incentive. Did the trial court 
properly rule that Plaintiff does not have sufficient evidence that Defendants' alleged 
negligence caused Plaintiffs alleged damages to submit his claims to a jury? 
Standard of Review: In reviewing a grant of summary judgment, this Court 
reviews the trial court's legal conclusions for correctness. Christens en & Jensen, RC. v. 
1 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Barrett & Dairies, 2008 UT 64, \ 19, 194 P.3d 931. This Court reviews the facts and all 
reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the non-moving party. Id. This 
Court should "determine only whether the trial court erred in applying the governing law 
and whether the trial court correctly held that there were no disputed issues of material 
fact.55 Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah 1996) (citations omitted). 
Preservation: The parties raised this issue in their summary judgment briefing. 
[R. 210-402, 403-05, 414-16, 417-667, 668-904, 908-921.] 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES AND REGULATIONS 
There are no constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances or rules that are 
determinative of the issue on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. NATURE OF CASE, COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS, AND DISPOSITION 
BELOW. 
Plaintiff sued his former lawyer and law firm in 2009 for breach of contract and 
negligence based on alleged legal malpractice. [R. 2-11.] The Complaint alleged that 
Plaintiff, co-trustee of a "Trust," retained Defendants in connection with his desire to 
make "gifts" to the 15 beneficiaries of the Trust and thereby to resolve any potential 
claims those beneficiaries had against Plaintiff. [R. 3, 6.] The Complaint alleged that 
Defendants prepared release documents that 12 out of 15 Trust beneficiaries signed. 
Plaintiff claims Defendants were negligent in drafting the release documents and in 
failing to properly advise Plaintiff. [See generally R. 3-10.] Plaintiff further alleged that, 
2 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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as a result of the alleged negligence, the Slater Brothers sued him and that he spent 
approximately $900,000 in litigation fees and settlement payments as a result. [R. 7.] 
Defendants initially moved to dismiss the Complaint, arguing the Complaint failed 
to plead facts showing the required causal link between the alleged breach/negligence and 
damages. [R. 16-70, 74-76, 102-14.] The trial court denied Defendants' motion. [R. 
126-27.] 
The parties conducted extensive fact discovery. [See e.g., R. 1, 161-62, 165-66, 
167-69, 170-72, 173-75, 181-82, 183-91, 192-200, 201-09.] After obtaining affidavits 
from two of the beneficiaries who sued Plaintiff, Defendants filed a Motion for Summary 
Judgment, arguing that Plaintiff could not support his causation theory with evidence. 
[R. 210-402, 403-05.] Fact discovery was then extended to accommodate depositions of 
the Slater Brothers. Fact discovery closed on April 15, 2011. [See R. 406-08, 412-13, 
Amended Scheduling Order.] 
Defendants then filed their renewed Motion for Summary Judgment. [R. 414-16, 
417-667.] After extensive briefing and two hearings, the trial court granted the motion by 
order dated September 16, 2011. [R. 932-35.] The trial court ruled that when Plaintiff 
paid $24,000 to each of the 12 beneficiaries who signed the settlement documents, he was 
fully informed and aware that the Slater Brothers had not signed releases and could still 
sue him. [R. 933.] 
Plaintiff now appeals that order. 
3 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
II. STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Saul Breton Creates a Testamentary Grandchildren's Trust. 
1. In 1981, Saul Breton executed his will, in which there was created a 
trust through which he intended to provide $1,000,000 for the benefit of his 
grandchildren (the "Trust"). [R. 452-81, esp. 454-56.1] 
2. Saul Breton's four children—Neil Breton ("Plaintiff' or "Neil"), 
William Breton ("Willie"), Jana Hadany, and Rhonda Slater—became co-trustees of the 
Trust. [R.474.] 
3. As of May 1994, the Trust had no assets. [R. 598.] 
B. The Relationship between Plaintiff and the Slater Family "Completely 
Deteriorates.55 
4. Also by the mid-1990s, Plaintiffs relationship with his sister, 
Rhonda Slater, and her family "completely deteriorated." [R. 599.] 
5. The decline stemmed from "years of litigation," which included 
litigation directly between Plaintiff and the Slaters, including a case in which Plaintiff 
foreclosed on the Slaters' home. [R. 600-03, 613.] 
6. Plaintiff testified that his foreclosure on the Slaters' home was the 
cause of the Slater Brothers' eventual lawsuit against Plaintiff, which they filed in 2007: 
This document was authenticated at R. 620. 
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[I]n my opinion, this is the whole genesis of why the grandkids [the Slater 
Brothers] decided to pursue this lawsuit 15 years later, is because they were 
told by their parents that Uncle Neil was throwing them out of their house 
for no known reason, never explained, and they never, in their depositions, 
ever asked once why they were packing up and leaving. They were just told 
they were being thrown out on the street. 
[R. 602.] 
7. The disputes and relations between Plaintiff and the Slaters became 
so bitter that Mark Slater (Rhonda's husband) threatened to kill Neil. [R. 712.] 
C. Breton Slater Wants to Sue Plaintiff, but Lacks Financial Resources to 
Do So. 
8. In May 1998, Rhonda Slater's oldest son and Plaintiffs nephew, 
Breton Slater, graduated from high school and sent a letter to Plaintiff, Willie Breton and 
Jana Hadany, inquiring whether Trust funds were available to help pay for his college 
education. Breton Slater also requested an accounting of the Trust assets. [R. 442, 484, 
638-39.] 
9. Plaintiff responded to Breton Slater's request. [R. 443, 487, 639.] | 
10. Unsatisfied with Plaintiffs response, Breton Slater sent a second 
letter to Plaintiff and Willie in June 1998, again requesting an accounting of Trust assets. 
[R. 443, 490.] 
11. Willie Breton responded to Breton Slater's June 1998 letter. [See R. 
493.] < 
12. Breton Slater sent a third letter to Plaintiff and Willie on 
September 10, 1998. Breton Slater threatened to sue for an accounting and to remove the 
trustees if he did not receive a full accounting. [R. 444, 493.] 
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13. Plaintiff responded to Breton Slater's September 10, 1998 letter. [R. 
444, 496-98.] 
14. Breton Slater again felt that the response was insufficient as it "did 
not provide me with any real accounting in the form of financial statements or Trust or 
business financial records prepared or reviewed by an accountant." Breton Slater 
believed Plaintiff was attempting to avoid the truth with "scribble talk." [R. 444; see also 
R. 640, 643-45.] 
15. Through this correspondence, Breton Slater came to believe "that the 
Trust, which was supposed to have started with $1,000,000 in assets, essentially had no 
real assets." [R. 444; see also R. 634, 645.] 
16. Breton Slater also "believed that the trustees had mismanaged Trust 
assets, breached fiduciary duties owed to the beneficiaries, and were attempting to hide 
their mismanagement from the beneficiaries and [his] family." [R. 444, 633.] 
17. Breton Slater threatened to bring a suit against Plaintiff in 1998. [R. 
490, 493, 604-06.] 
18. Breton Slater would have filed a lawsuit against Plaintiff in 1998, 
but at the time, he did not have "the financial resources and legal assistance required." 
Without financial means to hire a lawyer, he "felt helpless to seek any recourse against 
what [he] believed was serious mismanagement of Trust assets by Neil, whom [he] did 
not trust at all." [R. 444-45; see also R. 636, 640, 652-53.] 
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D. Plaintiff Retains Clyde Snow & Sessions to Draft Releases. 
19. In 2004 and 2005, Defendants advised and represented Plaintiff with 
respect to his role as co-trustee of the Trust, his desire to make gifts from his personal 
funds to the beneficiaries of the Trust to the end of resolving any outstanding issues and 
potential claims of beneficiaries against the co-trustees of the Trust, and the termination 
of the Trust. [R. 3.] 
20. Defendants, with input from Plaintiff and Willie Breton, drafted 
release documents that were to be sent to all fifteen of the Trust beneficiaries. [R. 662-
67.] 
21. Plaintiff wanted to protect three of the co-trustees, Willie, Jana, and 
himself, from any subsequent litigation. Plaintiff wanted this plan to be an "all or 
nothing" plan. Either all of the beneficiaries would release the co-trustees and all would 
get payments or none would get payments. [R. 712-14.] 
22. In December 2004, the fifteen Trust beneficiaries, including the 
Slater Brothers, received a letter from Plaintiff and Willie Breton, which discussed the 
loss of the Trust assets and proposed a payment of $24,000 to each grandchild, 
purportedly from Plaintiffs own personal assets ("Release Letter"). [R. 445, 501-03, 
629-30.] 
23. Enclosed with the Release Letter were documents drafted by 
Defendants entitled "Receipt and Release and Consent to Termination of Trust by Sworn 
Statement" ("Release Documents"). [R. 445, 505-06, 629-30.] 
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24. The Release Letter informed the Trust beneficiaries that "[e]ach 
payment [of $24,000 to each grandchild] would be conditioned upon each child and each 
grandchild (or such legal guardian if under age 18) agreeing to the termination of the 
Grandchildren's Trust and waiving all claims against the Trustees of the Grandchildren's 
Trust." [R. 503.] 
E. Plaintiff Pays Twelve of the Trust Beneficiaries with Full Knowledge 
that the Slater Brothers Had Not Signed Releases and Could Still Sue 
Him. 
25. Twelve of the grandchildren signed the Release Documents. [See R. 
6.] 
26. Although he knew that the Slater Brothers had not signed the 
Release Documents, Plaintiff made the $24,000 distributions to each of the other twelve 
signing beneficiaries in early February 2005. [R. 594, 609-11.] 
27. Plaintiff complains that Defendants did not tell him that he could not 
distribute funds to the twelve beneficiaries who had signed the Release Documents 
without violating the "all or nothing" plan. [R. 713.] Of course, this fact is plainly 
obvious, and is something of which Plaintiff was fully informed and aware. Plaintiff 
admits he already knew that, without the signed Release Documents, the Slater Brothers 
were still free to sue him. [R. 611-13.] 
28. The decision to distribute funds to twelve of the beneficiaries despite 
not having the three Slater Brothers' releases was made by Plaintiff, Willie, and Jana. [R. 
610.] 
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F. The Slater Brothers Refuse to Sign Releases. 
29. The three Slater Brothers (Rhonda and Mark Slater's children) 
indicated in June and July 2005 that they were going to sign the Release Documents. [R. 
823-24.] 
30. In August or September 2005, Breton Slater began discussing the 
issues surrounding the Trust with his paternal uncle, Mike Rosson. Mr. Rosson suggested 
that Breton Slater sign the Release Documents if: (1) Plaintiff agreed to pay the Slater 
Brothers $66,666.66 each (equal to 1/15 of the original $1,000,000 corpus of the trust), 
and (2) Plaintiff provided full releases of any claims against Rhonda and Mark Slater 
(something Plaintiff had previously proposed). [R. 446; see also R. 641-42, 776, 894.] 
31. In September 2005, Breton Slater sent an email to Plaintiff and 
Willie Breton, in which Breton Slater offered to settle for payment of $66,666.66 to 
himself and each of his brothers and full releases of his parents. [R. 446, 509.] 
32. Plaintiff did not accept Breton Slater's offer. [R. 447, 642.] 
33. The three Slater Brothers ultimately decided they would not sign the 
Release Documents for several reasons: (1) lack of trust of Plaintiff; (2) negative feelings 
toward Plaintiff due to past experiences between Plaintiff and the Slater family; (3) desire 
to know the truth about the Trust assets and whether they had been misappropriated or 
mismanaged; (4) disbelief that the $24,000 was really a gift from Plaintiff and belief that 
the payment likely came from funds that should have belonged to the Trust; (5) offense at 
the notion that Plaintiff would attempt to buy off the Trust beneficiaries; (6) lack of 
interest in receiving any "gift" from Plaintiff; and (7) lack of interest in accepting 
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$24,000 in exchange for signing the Release Documents. [R. 445, 576-77, 630-32, 649-
51.] 
G. The Slater Brothers Sue Plaintiff Using Funds Provided by Their Uncle 
Mike Rosson. 
34. In 2004 and 2005, the Slater Brothers again considered suing 
Plaintiff and Willie, and "the only reason [they] did not bring a lawsuit against Neil at 
that time was [they] did not have any money or other resources with which to hire a 
lawyer." [R. 445-46, 577, 636, 652-53.] 
35. Breton Slater continued to discuss the Trust with Mike Rosson, and 
in 2006 or 2007, Mr. Rosson offered to pay an attorney so the Slater Brothers could bring 
a lawsuit against Plaintiff. [R. 447, 636, 653.] 
36. The Slater Brothers accepted the offer and retained the law firm of 
Christensen, Glaser, Fink, Jacobs, Weil & Shapiro ("Christensen Glaser") in California. 
[R. 447, 577.] 
37. In June 2007, two and one half years after Defendants drafted the 
Release Documents, Christensen Glaser filed a Petition against Plaintiff and Willie, on 
behalf of the Slater Brothers, in the Superior Court for the State of California. The 
Petition alleged claims against Plaintiff and Willie for, among other things, breach of 
fiduciary duties in mismanaging the Trust and its assets. [R. 447-48, 519-59, 578.] 
38. In about May 2008, Plaintiff paid $75,000.00 to each of the Slater 
Brothers in settlement of their claims (for a total of $225,000.00). [R. 562-72, esp. 564, 
621.] 
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H. The Slater Brothers Did Not Sue Plaintiff Because the Other Twelve 
Beneficiaries' Releases Gave Them an "Economic Incentive." 
39. In this lawsuit (Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions), Plaintiff 
alleges, "After the other 12 Receipts and Releases were signed, the Slater Boys claimed 
that they were the sole beneficiaries of the Grandchildren's Trust. This result placed the 
Slater Boys in an economically viable position to initiate the litigation against 
[Plaintiff]." [R. 6.] 
40. Plaintiff testified, "I strongly believe that they [the Slater Brothers] 
saw this consent and release where they believed that they were the only three 
beneficiaries as their opportunity to finally use something that appeared to be a hammer 
to have filed a lawsuit." [R. 615.] 
41. When asked in his deposition what evidence he had to support this 
theory, Plaintiff could only state that "15 years went by without a correspondence or a 
letter and within a very short period of time after getting these consent and releases," the 
Slater Brothers decided to sue. Plaintiff believes this is "not coincidental" and simply 
states, "I take that all without any doubt in my mind whatsoever that they waited patiently 
for the opportunity. That's my belief." [R. 615-16; see also R. 617-19.] 
42. The Slater Brothers testified that their decision to sue in 2007 was 
motivated by their belief that Plaintiff and Willie had breached fiduciary duties by 
mismanaging the Trust assets, as well as by the fact that they finally had financial 
resources from Mike Rosson to pay for legal counsel. [R. 447, 578, 633-36, 652-53.] 
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43. The three Slater Brothers each testified that the fact that the other 
Trust beneficiaries may have signed the Release Documents was not a factor in their 
decision to sue Plaintiff and Willie in 2007. [R. 447-48, 578, 635, 654-55.] 
44. The suggestion that the Slater Brothers sued the Plaintiff because 
they believed they had an increased economic incentive to sue is not true. Such 
considerations did not enter the minds of the Slater Brothers and were not a factor in their 
decision to sue Plaintiff and Willie Breton. [R. 447-48, 578, 635-36, 654-55.] 
45. Likewise, an alleged "economic incentive" to sue based on the 
theory that the three Slater Brothers owned more than 3/15ths of the Trust had no impact 
in Mr. Rosson's decision to fund the Slater Brothers' lawsuit. In fact, the "economic 
incentive" theory never even entered Mr. Rosson's mind at any time. [R. 625.] 
46. In his sworn Affidavit, Breton Slater specifically stated: 
At the time we retained the Christensen Glaser Law Firm and filed 
the lawsuit against Neil and Willie, we had heard the other Trust 
beneficiaries (Saul's other 12 grandchildren) had signed the Receipt 
and Release documents, but we had never seen those signed 
documents and were uncertain whether they had been signed. 
Nevertheless, the fact that the other Trust beneficiaries had 
purportedly signed the Receipt and Release documents was not even 
the slightest factor in my decision or that of my brothers to sue Neil 
and Willie. The notion that the other Trust beneficiaries may have 
signed the Receipt and Release documents and had thereby given me 
and my brothers an increased stake in the Trust, or a so-called 
increased economic incentive to sue, is untrue. Such considerations 
did not enter into my mind at the time I hired the Christensen Glaser 
Law Firm and were not a factor in my decision or that of my 
brothers to sue Neil and Willie. 
[R. 447-48.] (Breton Slater Aff. 129.) 
47. Jordan Slater similarly stated: 
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At the time we retained the Christensen Glaser law firm and filed the 
lawsuit against Neil and Willie, I had heard the other Trust 
beneficiaries had signed the Receipt and Release documents, but I 
had never seen those signed documents and was uncertain whether 
they existed. The fact that the other Trust beneficiaries had 
purportedly signed the Receipt and Release documents was no factor 
in my decision or that of my brothers to sue Neil and Willie. The 
suggestion that the other Trust beneficiaries may have signed the 
Receipt and Release documents and had thereby given me and my 
brothers an increased stake in the Trust, or a so-called increased 
economic incentive to sue, is untrue. Such a consideration did not 
enter into my mind at the time I hired the Christensen Glaser law 
firm and was not a factor in my decision or that of my brothers to 
sue Neil and Willie. 
[R. 578.] (Jordan Slater Aff. % 13.) 
48. Because they had financial resources that were previously 
unavailable and because they believed Plaintiff and Willie had mismanaged the Trust 
assets and breached their fiduciary duties, the Slater Brothers "would have sued Plaintiff 
and Willie in 2007 regardless of whether or not the other Trust beneficiaries had signed 
the Receipt and Release documents." [R. 448, 578; see also R. 633-36.] 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
In order to survive summary judgment, Plaintiff was required to come forward 
with some credible, admissible evidence that, but for Defendants' alleged negligence, 
Plaintiff would have been better off. The trial court properly recognized that there is no 
such evidence in this case. 
Plaintiff has produced no evidence and can only speculate that the Slater Brothers 
would not have sued him had Defendants drafted documents and advised Plaintiff as 
13 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
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Plaintiff now claims they should have. All of the evidence shows that the alleged 
negligence made no difference; the Slater Brothers would have sued Plaintiff anyway. 
The trial court also properly ruled that Plaintiff caused his own damages. Plaintiff 
is the one who made the decision to pay some of the Trust beneficiaries with full 
knowledge that the Slater Brothers were still free to sue him. Plaintiffs own acts foiled 
his desire for an "all or nothing" settlement. Plaintiff cannot be heard to complain that 
Defendants failed to advise him of what he already knew. Plaintiff also candidly 
admitted that the Slater Brothers' lawsuit was caused by years of animosity between 
Plaintiff and the Slater family, culminating in Plaintiff foreclosing on the Slaters5 
residence and forcing the entire family out of their home. 
The trial court's ruling was also correct because the evidence conclusively shows 
that the Slater Brothers were never motivated to sue Plaintiff based on anything 
Defendants did (or failed to do), or by any condition Defendants created. The Slater 
Brothers all conclusively testified that they sued Plaintiff because he breached his 
fiduciary duties as trustee of the Trust (or at least they so believed), and their Uncle Mike 
Rosson finally provided the financial resources to sue Plaintiff in 2007. The alleged 
economic incentive on which Plaintiffs causation theory relies was not even the slightest 
factor in the Slater Brothers decision to sue Plaintiff. 
Plaintiff has failed to produce any evidence on which a reasonable juror could rule 
in favor of Plaintiff on the necessary element of causation. 
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ARGUMENT 
I. THE PROXIMATE CAUSE REQUIREMENT. 
Proximate cause is an essential element of any legal malpractice claim, whether 
the claim is asserted as negligence or breach of contract. See Christensen & Jensen, P.C. 
v. Barrett & Daines, 2008 UT 64, % 23-24, 194 P.3d 931 (a legal malpractice claim based 
on breach of contract requires showing of "damages to the plaintiff resulting from the 
breach11); Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433, 439 (Utah 1996) (a negligence claim against a 
lawyer requires causal connection between the breach of duty and resulting injury); 
Crestwood Cove Apts. Business Trust v. Turner, 2007 UT 48, If 30, 164 P.3d 1247 (in a 
legal malpractice action, the plaintiff must plead and prove "causal connection between 
the breach of duty and the resulting injury"). 
"Proximate cause is that cause which, in natural and continuous sequence 
(unbroken by an efficient intervening cause), produces the injury and without which the 
result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause—the one that necessarily sets in 
operation the factors that accomplish the injury." Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 (internal 
quotation marks and alterations omitted). Proximate cause can be determined as a matter 
of law on summary judgment when: (i) the facts are so clear that reasonable persons 
could not disagree about the facts or the application of a legal standard to the facts, or (ii) 
when facts are so tenuous that determining causation becomes speculative. Id.; 
Crestwood Cove, 2007 UT 48, f 32. 
In a legal malpractice case, the Plaintiff must demonstrate both actual cause and 
proximate cause. Actual cause is a showing that "but for the attorney's wrong the[] 
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[client's] loss would not have occurred." Kilpatrick v. Wiley, Rein & Fielding, 909 P.2d 
1283, 1291 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). Plaintiff must also show "a reasonable likelihood that 
[he] would have ultimately benefited." Id. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY RULED THAT DEFFENDANTS' 
ALLEGED CONDUCT DID NOT CAUSE PLAINTIFFS' ALLEGED 
INJURY. 
The trial court ruled: 
The Court determines as a matter of law and undisputed fact that the 
alleged conduct on the part of Defendants did not cause the alleged injury. 
Defendants could not have possibly forced the Slater Brothers to sign the 
releases. Moreover, it is undisputed, based on Plaintiffs own testimony, 
that Plaintiff was fully informed and aware, when he paid $24,000 to each 
of the twelve beneficiaries who had signed releases, that the Slater Brothers 
had not signed any release and were still free to sue Plaintiff. Therefore, 
the alleged failure to advise Plaintiff of something he fully understood did 
not cause the alleged injury. Plaintiffs own decision . . . to pay $24,000 to 
each of the signing beneficiaries without first obtaining releases from the 
Slater Brothers was an independent and intervening cause of the alleged 
injury. 
[R. 933-34.] 
The trial court was correct. Plaintiffs' alleged damages were not caused by 
anything Defendants did or failed to do.2 Rather, they were caused by his own actions 
and the actions of the Slater Brothers, neither of which Defendants could control. 
2 
Because this appeal focuses only on causation, Defendants have not yet contested the 
allegations that they were negligent and breached a contract. For the record, Defendants 
do not admit that any of their conduct was negligent or otherwise wrongful even though 
these issues are not now before the Court. 
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A. Defendants' Alleged Negligent Drafting and Failure to Provide Advice 
Did Not Cause Plaintiffs Damages Because Defendants Could Not 
Force the Slater Brothers to Sign the Release Documents and Plaintiff 
was Fully Informed. 
Plaintiff alleges he hired Defendants to "resolv[e] any outstanding issues and 
resolv[e] any potential claims of [the] beneficiaries against the co-trustees of the Trust." 
[R. 3.] To achieve this, Plaintiff claims he wanted an "all or nothing" plan, pursuant to 
which all of the beneficiaries would sign releases or none of them would get paid. [R. 
712-14.] Plaintiff claims Defendants' failure to draft "all or nothing" releases, together 
with Defendants' failure to advise him against paying off some of the beneficiaries, 
caused him damages. See, e.g., Appellant Br. at 20. 
In order to prevail on this argument, Plaintiff must demonstrate that, but for the 
alleged negligent drafting and failure to advise, Plaintiff would not have experienced a 
loss and would likely have achieved a better outcome, i.e., that the Slater Brothers would 
not have sued him. See Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1291. As the trial court recognized, there 
is no such evidence in this case. 
If the Court were to assume, for example, that Defendants had drafted perfectly 
clear "all or nothing" Release Documents,3 there is no evidence that Plaintiff would likely 
have achieved a better outcome. There is no evidence to suggest that Plaintiff or 
Defendants would have had better success persuading the Slater Brothers to sign more 
"perfect" Release Documents. As the trial court correctly concluded, Defendants had no 
3
 Defendants do not concede that the Release Documents they drafted were not "all or 
nothing" releases. 
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power to force the Slater Brothers to sign any form of any release. [R. 933.] Likewise, 
there is no evidence to suggest that the Slater Brothers would not have sued Plaintiff 
regardless of the form of the Release Documents. 
Moreover, the alleged negligent drafting did not cause Plaintiff to distribute 
$24,000 to the other beneficiaries without first getting the Slater Brothers' signatures. 
Plaintiff made that decision on his own, along with Willie and Jana. It was Plaintiffs 
own act of distributing money to the twelve beneficiaries that foiled the "all or nothing" 
plan. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did so with a full understanding that the Slater 
Brothers were still free to sue him. [R. 611-13.] The trial court was correct in ruling that 
Defendants cannot be held liable for failing to advise Plaintiff of something he already 
fully understood. Cf. Ellertson v. Dansie, 576 P.2d 867, 868 (Utah 1978) (a property 
owner has no duty to warn an invitee of an obvious dangerous condition). Had Plaintiff 
not placed himself in the position of having paid off twelve of the beneficiaries while 
knowing that the other three might sue him, he might have had an opportunity to realize 
an "all or nothing" plan. But when Plaintiff made the decision to pay some, but not all, 
of the beneficiaries, he caused his own desired outcome to fail. 
The trial court was also correct in ruling that Plaintiffs own conduct was an 
intervening cause of his own damages. "An intervening cause is an independent event, 
not reasonably foreseeable, that completely breaks the chain of causation between fault 
and damages." Kilpatrick, 909 P.2d at 1293. In the proper case, intervening cause can be 
decided on summary judgment. See e.g., Ellertson, 576 P.2d at 868 (affirming summary 
judgment ruling that plaintiffs own conduct was the intervening cause of injury); 
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Crestwood Cove, 2007 UT 48, ]f 33, n. 45 (citing with approval a legal malpractice case 
in which the court affirmed summary judgment because an intervening cause was the 
proximate cause of the alleged damages). 
Plaintiffs own act, unforeseen and not controlled by Defendants, is what caused 
the all or nothing plan to fail. And, to the extent the "economic incentive" theory has any 
legal validity (which it does not),4 Plaintiffs own act of paying off the twelve "releasing" 
beneficiaries is what created the so-called "increased economic incentive" for the Slater 
The argument that the Slater Brothers had a legal right to recover 100% of the damages 
suffered by all 15 Trust beneficiaries at the hands of the co-trustees of the Trust is 
incorrect as a matter of law. The Restatement (Third) of Trusts makes this clear. It 
states, for example: 
[T]he granting of a release by one or more of the beneficiaries does not 
preclude other beneficiaries of the trust from holding the trustee liable for 
the breach, insofar as their interests are affected. 
4 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 97, cmt. c(l) (2012) (emphasis added). The 
illustrations make clear that a non-releasing beneficiary is entitled to recover only that 
beneficiary's share of the loss, and not the shares of loss belonging (or formerly 
belonging) to the beneficiaries who released the trustee. See id., Illus. 6-8. 
A comment to Section 78 of The Restatement (Third) of Trusts also states: 
[I]f one or more but less than all of the beneficiaries consent to a prohibited 
transaction, the transaction constitutes a breach of trust, although one for 
which the trustee is not liable to any beneficiary from whom (or on whose 
behalf) consent has been properly obtained. 
3 Restatement (Third) of Trusts § 78, cmt. c (2007) (emphasis added); see also 
Restatement (Second) of Trusts § 216, cmt. c and illus. 8-9; Gaynor v. Payne, 804 A.2d 
170, 174 (Conn. 2002) (successor executor could sue prior executor for breach of trust, 
but only on behalf of non-settling contingent beneficiaries and not on behalf of 
beneficiaries who had signed releases). 
Thus, the trustee's liability is limited to the non-releasing beneficiary's share of 
the loss. 
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Brothers to sue. It is simply too far-fetched for any reasonable juror to conclude that 
Defendants are liable for failing to advise Plaintiff of a legally incorrect theory that 
Plaintiff brought upon himself and that was never the slightest factor in the Slater 
Brothers' decision to sue. 
Summary dismissal is also supported by the Utah Supreme Court's decision in 
Harline v. Barker, 912 P.2d 433 (Utah 1996). In that case, the Supreme Court affirmed 
summary judgment in a legal malpractice case, holding as a matter of law that the 
Plaintiff could not establish the essential element of causation. Id. at 444-46. The Court 
held as a matter of law that the plaintiffs failure to obtain a bankruptcy discharge was 
caused by the plaintiffs own acts, and not by any alleged failure on the part of the 
lawyers involved. Id. Plaintiffs attempt to distinguish Harline is unavailing because it is 
undisputed that Plaintiff was fully informed of the possible result of paying the signing 
beneficiaries without getting the Slater Brothers' signatures. [R 611-13.] Like the 
plaintiff in Harline, Plaintiff caused his own alleged damages and failed to come forward 
with any evidence that would allow him to proceed on his theory of causation. 
B. There Is No Evidence to Support a Finding of Causation, and All 
Available Evidence Conclusively Refutes a Finding of Causation. 
The trial court's ruling is also supported by the fact that there is no evidence upon 
which a jury could reasonably find causation. While the trial court did not expressly 
support its ruling on this basis, this Court can and should do so. Harline, 912 P.2d at 438 
(appellate courts "may affirm a grant of summary judgment on any ground available to 
the trial court, even if it is not one relied on below") (citations omitted). 
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Because Plaintiff would bear the burden of proof at trial, Plaintiff "must set forth 
specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial" Orvis v. Johnson, 2008 UT 
2, If 18, 177 P.3d 600. The trial court was required to draw reasonable factual inferences 
in Plaintiffs favor, but it was not required to draw every possible inference of fact, no 
matter how remote or improbable, in Plaintiffs favor. IHC Health Servs., Inc. v. D&K 
Mgmt, Inc., 2008 UT 73, | 19, 196 P.3d 588. On summary judgment the Court must 
apply an "objective standard, seek[ing] to find whether reasonable jurors, properly 
instructed, would be able to come to only one conclusion." Clegg v. Wasatch County, 
2010 UT 5, Tf 15, 227 P.3d 1243. In this case, there is not enough evidence on which a 
reasonable juror could find in Plaintiffs' favor on the essential element of causation. 
Plaintiffs loss causation theory is dependent on evidence that the Slater Brothers 
were motivated to sue based on the alleged increased economic incentive. [See R. 6 
(Plaintiffs Complaint, alleging "Defendants' scheme created a perfect opportunity and a 
significant economic incentive for the Slater Boys to initiate litigation against Neil and 
William"); Appellant Br. at 20-22 ("Defendants' malpractice . . . caused the Slater Boys 
to believe that they held 100% interest in the GC Trust, providing them with the 
economic incentive to sue Neil, causing his damages.").] The undisputed evidence 
demonstrates that Plaintiffs causation theory is false. 
1. The only competent witnesses have conclusively testified they 
were not motivated by the alleged "economic incentive." 
First, the Slater Brothers are the only witnesses competent to testify about what 
motivated them to sue Plaintiff. They have each unequivocally testified that the so-called 
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increased economic incentive played absolutely no role in their decision to sue Plaintiff. 
[R. 447-48, 578, 635-36, 654-55.] For example, Breton Slater testified: 
[T]he fact that the other Trust beneficiaries had purportedly signed the 
Receipt and Release documents was not even the slightest factor in my 
decision or that of my brothers to sue Neil and Willie. The notion that the 
other Trust beneficiaries may have signed the Receipt and Release 
documents and had thereby given me and my brothers an increased stake in 
the Trust, or a so-called increased economic incentive to sue, is untrue. 
Such considerations did not enter into my mind at the time I hired the 
Christensen Glaser Law Firm and were not a factor in my decision or that 
of my brothers to sue Neil and Willie. 
[R. 447-48.] The other two Slater Brothers gave similar testimony. [R. 578, 654-55.] 
The Slater Brothers' uncontroverted testimony is corroborated by the fact that they 
had wanted to sue Plaintiff for many years prior to actually suing him. [See, e.g., R. 444-
45, 577, 636, 652-53.] It was not until they finally received financial backing from their 
Uncle Mike Rosson that they were able to do so, and they sued Plaintiff within months of 
obtaining their uncle's financial support. [See R. 447, 519-59, 578, 636, 653.] 
The Slater Brothers explained the factors that did motivate them to sue Plaintiff. 
First, they believed Plaintiff has mismanaged the Trust. [E.g., R. 444.] Those desires 
and beliefs were fueled by years of animosity between Plaintiff and the Slater family, 
including numerous prior lawsuits, a foreclosure action in which the Slater Brothers were 
told Plaintiff "thr[ew] them out of their house for no known reason," and even a threat by 
Mark Slater to kill Plaintiff. [See, e.g. R. 599, 600-03, 613, 712.] The alleged increased 
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economic incentive to sue, a theory that is legally wrong,5 had nothing to do with the 
Slater Brothers' decision to sue. [R. 447-48, 578, 635-36, 654-55.] 
2. Plaintiff admitted the past animosity between himself and the 
Slaters caused the lawsuit that led to his damages. 
Plaintiff even admitted in candor that the cause of the Slater Brothers' lawsuit was 
the fact that Plaintiff had previously foreclosed on the Slaters' family residence: 
[I] n my opinion, this is the whole genesis of why the grandkids decided to 
pursue this lawsuit 15 years later, is because they were told by their parents 
that Uncle Neil was throwing them out of their house for no known reason, 
never explained, and they never, in their depositions, ever asked once why 
they were packing up and leaving. They were just told they were being 
thrown out on the street. 
[R. 602.] 
By Plaintiffs own admission the "proximate cause" of his injury - the "cause 
which, in natural and continuous sequence . . . produced [his] injury" - was his own bitter 
litigious history against the Slater family. See Harline, 912 P.2d at 439 (defining 
proximate cause) (citations omitted). 
3. Plaintiff failed to produce any actual evidence to support his 
causation theory. 
Plaintiff had a fair opportunity during discovery to bring forward evidence to 
prove his economic incentive theory of causation but, in addition to refuting it with his 
own testimony as just described, he failed to support it. During his deposition, Plaintiff 
was specifically asked what evidence he had to support his economic incentive theory. 
5
 See supra note 4. 
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His only answer did not provide any admissible evidence that the Slater Brothers were 
somehow motivated to sue based on an increased economic incentive. [See R. 615-19.] 
4. All of Plaintiffs remaining arguments are based on speculation, 
unsupported by admissible evidence. 
In the trial court, Plaintiff attempted to avoid his complete lack of admissible 
evidence by weaving together arguments based on speculation and conjecture. Under 
Utah law, however, mere speculation cannot be used to defeat a motion for summary 
judgment. See, e.g., Clark v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 893 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995) (upholding summary judgment where there was no direct evidence of causation 
and the jury would be left to speculate regarding proximate cause). 
In Triesault v. Greater Salt Lake Bus. Dist, 2005 UT App 489, 126 P.3d 781, the 
plaintiff asserted claims for breach of fiduciary duty and intentional interference with 
prospective economic relations, but his theory of causation was based solely on the 
timing of the opening of the defendant's competing theater, and on a corresponding drop 
in revenue at the plaintiffs theater. Id. ^ 15. The Utah Court of Appeals held that this 
circumstantial evidence was not sufficient to create a material dispute because without 
any other evidence, the circumstantial evidence would require the jury to "engage in rank 
speculation to reach a verdict regarding causation." Id. f 14 (internal quotations omitted). 
Like the plaintiff in Triesault, Plaintiff relied on chronology in the trial court to 
attempt to establish a factual dispute regarding the Slater Brothers' motivation for their 
suit. [R. 692-95.] The Slater Brothers, however, are the only people who can 
competently testify regarding their motivation, and they have directly stated under oath 
24 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
that they sued because they believed Plaintiff violated his fiduciary duties. They further 
testified that they did not even consider the alleged economic incentive. Mike Rosson 
has also testified that the alleged economic incentive never entered his mind. Although 
Plaintiff asserts that the chronology supports his theory, with sworn statements to the 
contrary a jury would have to speculate to conclude that the Slater Brothers and Mike 
Rosson are simply lying in their affidavits and sworn testimony. Such speculation is not 
sufficient to refute the sworn statements made by both the Slater Brothers and Mike 
Rosson, especially since the chronology in this case is consistent with the sworn 
testimony. The chronology confirms that the Slater Brothers did not bring suit until they 
had definite funding for the litigation in 2007, funding that had previously been 
unavailable. The chronology also establishes that the Slater Brothers did not initiate their 
suit until June 2007. If the Slater Brothers were truly motivated by the alleged economic 
incentive—allegedly created by Defendants' actions in 2004—they would have had no 
reason to wait over two years to initiate their suit. 
Plaintiff also asserted in the trial court that the Slater Brothers had relatives who 
could have financed a suit long before 2007. [R. 676, 693.] Plaintiff provided no 
evidence, direct or circumstantial, that any relative was actually willing to finance a suit 
against Plaintiff, or the Slater Brothers actually believed they could rely on these 
speculative financial sources. The only evidence is that the Slater Brothers believed they 
did not have the financial resources to bring suit until their Uncle Mike offered to help. 
[R. 444-47, 636, 640, 652-53.] Plaintiffs conclusory argument that the Slater Brothers 
could have used other people's money to fund a suit, unsupported by any evidence, is not 
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sufficient to raise a genuine dispute. See Waddoups v. Amalgamated Sugar Co., 2002 UT 
69,f 34, 54 P.3d 1054 (conclusory assertions insufficient to demonstrate the existence of 
a genuine issue of material fact). 
Plaintiff also cited to the California litigation for the proposition that the Slater 
Brothers believed they held a 100% interest in the Trust. [R. 689, 695, 860-73.] Any 
such "belief on the part of the Slater Brothers is immaterial because all of the admissible 
evidence conclusively demonstrates that any such "belief had no bearing on the decision 
to sue. Moreover, the California Petition does not support Plaintiffs argument. In the 
Petition, the Slater Brothers merely allege that the other beneficiaries had released their 
interest in the Trust by signing the Release Documents. There is no specific allegation 
that the Slater Brothers believed that they held 100% interest in the Trust corpus. [See R. 
860-73.] In fact, in 2005, the Slaters offered to settle for their pro rata shares of the 
intended original $1,000,000 Trust. [R. 446, 509, 654-55.] 
Plaintiff further attempted to create a factual dispute by arguing that the Slater 
Brothers' beliefs regarding the alleged mismanagement of the Trust were not valid and 
was not based on a complete investigation. [R. 674-75.] The critical point on the issue of 
causation, however, is not whether Plaintiff actually mismanaged Trust funds, but 
whether the Slater Brothers believed Plaintiff had mismanaged the Trust. As early as 
1998, Breton Slater requested an accounting of the Trust because he believed Plaintiff 
had mismanaged the Trust. [R. 442-44, 484, 490, 493.] The Slater Brothers continuously 
held to this belief [Id; see also R. 445-47, 577-78, 633-36, 652-53.] It is irrelevant, and 
therefore immaterial, whether Plaintiff did or did not mismanage the Trust or whether 
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Breton Slater did or did not investigate before forming his beliefs. Even if these beliefs 
were mistaken or premature, the Slater Brothers nonetheless held these beliefs and were 
motivated by them. 
Finally, Plaintiff attacked the Slaters' credibility regarding their motivation to sue. 
Plaintiffs primary example was that one of the three brothers, Breton Slater, was not 
telling the truth in a 1998 letter he wrote to Plaintiff. [R. 675.] In that letter Breton 
Slater, who was 18 years old at the time, stated that a law student at UCLA law school 
helped him find some legal authorities regarding his rights as a trust beneficiary. [R. 
490.] When placed under oath to testify about this letter years later, Breton Slater 
admitted that he did not go to the UCLA law school and had not read the legal citations 
used in his letter. He testified that he put those statements in the letter so it would 
"resound more with Neil and Willie" rather than having an 18-year-old try to explain his 
legal rights. [R. 730, 740-41.] 
Had one or more of the Slater Brothers given inconsistent sworn testimony on a 
material fact, Plaintiff might then be able to argue that the Slaters' credibility on material 
issues precludes summary judgment. See, e.g., Martin v. Lauder, 2010 UT App 216, ^ 
14, 239 P.3d 519 (moving party's contentions rested on inconsistencies regarding a 
material fact between a witness's affidavit and deposition testimony). In this case, 
however, all of Breton Slater's alleged "untruths" are inconsequential and wholly 
irrelevant to anything in this case, and Breton Slater has consistently testified under oath 
regarding all of the facts material to this case. Plaintiff cannot point to any genuinely 
inconsistent sworn statements by any witness, let alone inconsistent statements regarding 
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any material fact. Plaintiff has not cited to any case, and Defendants are not aware of 
any, that would preclude summary judgment where the alleged inconsistent statement 
relates to an unsworn statement on a wholly inconsequential and irrelevant matter. 
Although circumstantial evidence may be sufficient in some cases to rebut a 
motion for summary judgment, Plaintiffs allegations and circumstantial arguments fall 
short on the issue of causation in this case. The material facts instead conclusively 
establish that the Slater Brothers were motivated to sue Plaintiff because of past family 
animosity and because they believed Plaintiff had breached his fiduciary duties. With 
this evidence directly refuting the "economic incentive" theory, Plaintiff cannot sustain 
his burden on the element of causation. 
CONCLUSION 
Plaintiff has failed to demonstrate that he would have been in any better position if 
Defendants had not committed the alleged negligence or breach of contract. All of the 
evidence demonstrates that the Slater Brothers sued Plaintiff in spite of Defendants' 
alleged conduct, and not because of it. No reasonable juror could rule in Plaintiffs favor. 
The judgment of the trial court should therefore be affirmed. 
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE WITH RULE 24<Dm 
This brief complies with the type-volume limitations of Utah R. App. P. 24(f)(1) 
because the brief contains 7,192 words, excluding parts of the brief exempted by Utah 
Rule App. P. 24(f)(1)(B). 
28 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
< 
This brief complies with the typeface requirements of Utah R. App. P. 27(b) 
because this brief has been prepared in proportionally spaced typeface using Word in 13-
point Times New Roman font. 
Respectfully submitted this jy\A day of April, 2012. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
^A^L^ 
Max ©. Wheeler 
Keith A. Call 
Melinda K. Bowen 
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellees 
< 
29 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that on the day of April, 2012,1 mailed two copies of the foregoing 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE CLYDE, SNOW & SESSIONS and HAL SWENSON via 
U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, to the following: 
Jeffrey R. Oritt 
EISENBERG GILCHRIST & CUTT 
215 South State Street, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorneys for Plaintiff/Appellant 
njQjL./4.Ga&g^ 
2055151 
30 Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN&MARTINEAU 
S A L T L A K H C I T Y • S T . G E O R G E 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
P.C. 
NOV 2 6 2012 
John E. Gates 
Kim R.Wilson 
Michael R. Carlston 
Max D. Wheeler 
Samuel Alba 
David W. Slaughter 
Shawn E. Draney 
John R.Lund 
Rodney R. Parker 
Richard A. Van Wagoner 
Andrew M. Morse 
Camille N.Johnson 
Elizabeth L.Willey 
E. Scott Awerkamp 
Dennis V.Dahle 
Korey D. Rasmussen 
Terence L. Rooney 
Jill L. Dunyon 
David L. Pinkston 
JUUJUIJC DLUKII 
Brian P. Miller 
Judith D.Wolfem 
Keith A. Call 
Kara L. Pettit 
Heather S.White 
Robert R. Harrison 
Robert W. Thompson 
Scott H. Martin 
Maralyn M. English 
Kenneth L. Reich 
Bradley R. Blackham 
Robert J. Shelby 
D.Jason Hawkins 
Richard A.Vazquez 
David F. Mull 
P. Matthew Cox 
Derek J.Williams 
Tammy B. Georgelas 
R. Scott Young 
Matthew W. Starley 
John S.Treu 
Christopher W. Droubay 
Scott C. Powers 
Nathan R. Skcen 
Brian A. Mills 
Melinda K. Bowcn 
Dani N. Cepernich 
Tsutomu Johnson 
Of Counsel 
Harold G. Christcnsen 
Reed L. Martineau 
A. Dennis Norton 
Allan L. Larson 
Sam Harkness 
November 26, 2012 
TfrCwtotf Writer: 
kcall@scmlaw.com 
(801)322-9144 
VIA HAND DELIVERY 
Ms. Lisa Collins 
Clerk of the Court 
UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
450 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
Re: Neil Breton v. Clyde, Snow & Sessions, et al 
Appellate Case No. 20110996-CA 
Oral Argument - November 29, 2012 (9:00 a.m.) 
Supplemental Citation of Authorities 
Dear Ms. Collins: 
We represent the Defendants/Appellees in the above-referenced case. We 
respectfully submit the following case as a supplemental authority on which we may rely 
at oral argument: 
State v. South, 924 P.2d 354 (Utah 1996). 
State v. South undermines an argument first made on pages 13-14 of the Reply 
Brief of the Appellant, dated May 21, 2012. State v. South supports Defendants/ 
Appellees' argument that the Court of Appeals may properly consider alternate grounds 
for affirming the judgment of the Trial Court. 
A copy of State v. South is enclosed with this letter and an original and seven 
copies of this letter are being submitted as required by Utah R. App. P. 24 (j). 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Keith A. Call 
KAC/mk 
Enclosure 
CC: Jeffrey R. Or i t t (via Hand Delivery) 
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H 
Supreme Court of Utah. 
STATE of Utah, Plaintiff and Petitioner, 
v. 
Jeffery Earl SOUTH and Dianna South, Defendants 
and Respondents. 
No. 950066. 
Aug. 30, 1996. 
Defendants were convicted in the First Circuit 
Court, Cache County, Burton H. Harris, J., of posses-
sion of controlled substance and possession of drug 
paraphernalia within 1,000 feet of church. The Court 
of Appeals, 885 P.2d 795, reversed. State's petition for 
writ of certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, 
Stewart. Associate C. J., held that even though state did 
not cross-appeal, Court of Appeals should have con-
sidered state's proffered alternative ground for affir-
mance that was raised below. 
Reversed and remanded. 
West Headnotes 
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110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
HOXXIV(L) Scope of Review in General 
110XXMD11 Parties Entitled to Allege 
Error 
110kll36 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
If litigants wish to attack judgment of lower court 
for purposes of enlarging their own rights or lessening 
rights of their opponent, they are required to 
cross-appeal or cross-petition. 
JH Criminal Law 110 € ^ 1 1 3 6 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
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llOXXIVfL) 11 Parties Entitled to Allege 
Error 
110k! 136 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
If appellees or respondents merely desire affir-
mance of lower court's judgment, they need not, and 
should not, cross-appeal or cross-petition. 
131 Criminal Law 110 €=^1136 
110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
llOXXIVfL) Scope of Review in General 
llOXXIVfL) 11 Parties Entitled to Allege 
Error 
1 lQkl 136 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Judgment or decision may be based on any 
number of subsidiary rulings or grounds, but as long 
as that judgment or decision produces distinct and 
tangible result, it is only result which requires appeal, 
cross-appeal, petition for certiorari, or cross-petition. 
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110 Criminal Law 
110XXIV Review 
llOXXIVfL) Scope of Review in General 
llOXXlVfDll Parties Entitled to Allege 
Error 
1 lQkl 136 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
On appeal of trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress evidence, Court of Appeals should 
have considered state's proffered alternative ground 
for affirmance that was raised below, even though 
state did not cross-appeal, but rather made the argu-
ment in its brief. 
*354 Jan Graham. Atty. Gen., Todd A. Utzinger. 
Carol Clawson. Asst. Attys. Gen., Salt Lake City, and 
Patrick B. Nolan, Jeffrey R. Burbank, Scott L. Wvatt 
Logan, for plaintiff. 
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Nathan D. Hult, Logan, and Jensie L. Anderson, 
ACLU, Salt Lake City, for defendants. 
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals 
STEWART, Associate Chief Justice: 
We granted the State's petition for a writ of cer-
tiorari to review the issue of whether a successful 
party in the trial court must file a cross-appeal to argue 
a ground for affirmance other than the ground relied 
on by the trial court. In the district court, Jeffery Earl 
South and Dianna South moved to suppress evidence 
of contraband seized at their residence in Logan, Utah, 
asserting that the warrant under which the evidence 
was seized did not authorize a search of their resi-
dence. The trial court agreed but denied their motion 
on the basis of the "plain smell" exception to the 
warrant requirement. The Souths appealed to the 
Court of Appeals, which reversed the trial court's 
ruling on the *355 "plain smell" issue. On that appeal, 
the State argued that the trial court had erred in hold-
ing the warrant invalid, but because the State had 
failed to cross-appeal the trial court's ruling on that 
issue, the Court of Appeals refused to consider it as an 
alternative ground for affirmance of the district court's 
judgment. We reverse the Court of Appeals. 
I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
On March 15, 1992, a Logan City police detective 
went to the Souths' residence to investigate a reported 
theft of a cellular phone. When Jeffery South an-
swered the door, the detective smelled the odor of 
burnt marijuana emanating from his residence and 
from his clothing. Shortly thereafter, the detective 
obtained a search warrant. The warrant expressly 
permitted a search of the persons at the Souths' address 
but did not authorize a search of the premises. ^ The 
detective returned to the Souths' residence accompa-
nied by three other officers. A search of the premises 
led to the confiscation of controlled substances and 
drug paraphernalia. Prior to trial, defendants moved to 
suppress this evidence, asserting that the warrant was 
defective because it authorized a search of the persons 
present but not of the premises. The trial court agreed 
that the warrant was "defective" ^ but ruled that the 
evidence was nevertheless admissible under the "plain 
smell" exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant 
requirement. State v. South 885 P.2d 795, 797 
(Ct.App.1994). cert, granted, 899 P.2d 1231 (Utah 
1995}; see also State v. Naisbitt. 827 P.2d 969. 972-73 
(Utah Ct.App. 19921 (describing plain smell doctrine). 
FN1. The State contends that this limitation 
in the scope of the warrant was merely the 
result of a technical oversight. 
FN2. The trial court employed this term in its 
memorandum decision, and the Court of 
Appeals generally noted that the trial court 
had found the warrant to be "invalid." These 
terms, however, may be somewhat mislead-
ing. It does not appear that the trial court 
found there was an insubstantial basis for 
issuing the warrant. Rather, according to the 
trial court, the express terms of the warrant 
"through inadvertence" did not permit as 
extensive a search as was actually conducted. 
Thus, it appears the actual basis for the trial 
court's ruling was that the search exceeded 
the scope of a valid warrant. 
The Souths appealed to the Court of Appeals. The 
State did not cross-appeal but instead argued in its 
brief that the trial court had erred in holding the search 
warrant invalid. The Court of Appeals refused to ad-
dress this argument, holding that the State must raise 
the issue on cross-appeal rather than simply presenting 
it as an argument in a responsive brief. South. 885 P.2d 
at 798. 
II. DISCUSSION 
[1][2] The question we address here is a narrow 
one: whether a responding party must file a 
cross-appeal or a cross-petition to raise an argument 
which was also raised below and which is offered 
merely as a ground for affirming the decision be-
low.— Although we are not bound by federal court 
decisions on this issue, to the extent that we find a 
federal approach to the problem useful and persuasive, 
we are free to adopt that approach. Plumb v. State. 809 
P,2d734, 741 (Utah 1990). The seminal case treating 
the issue of when a cross-appeal must be filed is 
Langnesv. Green. 282 U.S. 531. 538-39. 51 S.Ct. 243, 
246. 75 L.Ed. 520(1931). In brief, the Langnes doc-
trine requires litigants to cross-appeal or cross-petition 
if they wish to attack a judgment of a lower court for 
the purpose of enlarging their own rights or lessening 
the rights of their opponent. Id; *356 Terry v, Zions 
Coop. Mercantile Inst. 617 P.2d 700. 701 (Utah 
1980). Conversely, if appellees or respondents merely 
desire the affirmance of the lower court's judgment, 
they need not, and should not, cross-appeal or 
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cross-petition. "The practical justification for the rule 
is that a party satisfied with the action of a lower court 
should not have to appeal from it in order to defend a 
judgment in his or her favor on any ground no matter 
what an adversary does." Robert L. Stern et al., Su-
preme Court Practice 364 (7th ed. 1993). Nor should a 
party be allowed to employ its adversary's appeal or 
petition as a vehicle to gain a greater benefit than that 
granted below. Unnecessary cross-appeals also mul-
tiply the number of briefs filed and lead to confusion 
of the issues presented. See, e.g., Pearl v. Keystone 
Consol Indus.. Inc.. 884 F.2d 1047. 1053 (7th 
Cir,1989): Jordan v. Duff & Phelps, inc., 815 F.2d 
429. 439 (7th Cir.1987). The Langnes rule is thus 
grounded in fairness, common sense, and judicial 
efficiency.1^4 
FN3. We do not here address the question of 
whether an appellee may raise an argument 
in defense of the lower court's judgment 
when that argument was not presented in the 
lower court. We do note, however, that our 
previous opinions on that question have been 
somewhat inconsistent. See, e.g., Buehner 
Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892. 
894-95 (Utah 1988) (applying argument 
raised for first time on appeal to affirm lower 
court's decision); American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1. 4 (Utah 1984) 
nevertheless logically require that the lower 
court's decision be modified. See Robert L. 
Stern et al., Supreme Court Practice 364-65 
(7th ed. 1993). None of these circumstances 
applies to this case, and the Souths' reliance 
on them is misplaced. 
Before the Court of Appeals, the State argued that 
the omission in the warrant of authorization to search 
the premises was a technical defect not requiring 
suppression. Even though the trial court had expressly 
rejected this contention in its memorandum decision, 
the State argued it on appeal as an alternate ground for 
affirming the trial court's denial of the motion to sup-
press. The State relied on the principle that appellate 
courts may "affirm the trial court's decision to admit 
evidence on any proper grounds, even though the trial 
court assigned another reason for its ruling." State v. 
Gallegos. 712 P.2d 207. 209 (Utah 1985); see also 
O'Neal v. Division of Family Servs., 821 P.2d 1139, 
1141 (Utah 1991): Buehner Block Co. v. UWC 
Assocs.. 752 P.2d 892. 894-95 & n. 2 (Utah 1988): 
State v. Bryan. 709 P.2d 257. 260 (Utah 1985); In re 
Estate of Hock. 655 P.2d 1111. 1114 (Utah 1982): 
Allphin Realty, Inc. v. Sine. 595 P.2d 860. 861 (Utah 
1979). But see Henrettv v. Manti City Corp.. 791 P.2d 
506. 511 (Utah 1990): American Coal Co. v. 
Sandstrom. 689 P.2d 1. 4 (Utah 1984).^ 
(holding that argument offered in defense of 
decision below had been waived when not 
raised below); L & M Corp. v. Loader. 688 
P,2d 448. 449-50 (Utah 1984) (refusing to 
address argument offered on appeal in de-
fense of lower court's decision where that 
argument was not raised in pleadings or ar-
gued by parties below); Branch v. Western 
Petroleum. Inc.. 657 P.2d 267. 276 (Utah 
1982) (holding that appellate court, in af-
firming trial court's decision, may rely in part 
on a ground not presented to trial court). 
FN4. Since deciding Langnes, the United 
States Supreme Court has articulated a few 
clarifications or exceptions. The exceptions, 
however, relate only to a limited number of 
discrete circumstances, such as claims of 
improper venue or untimeliness, and to the 
rare occasion when, although an appellee 
does not request a change in the lower court's 
decision, the appellee's argument would 
FN5. Henretty treated the issue of whether 
Manti City had properly created a special 
improvement district for a designated section 
of highway. The plaintiffs in the case op-
posed the city's proposed "improvements." 
Before the district court, the plaintiffs argued 
both a substantive and a procedural ground as 
a basis for depriving the proposed improve-
ment district of jurisdiction to act. The dis-
trict court rejected the substantive ground but 
accepted the procedural argument and ruled 
that the improvement district had not been 
properly constituted. Manti City appealed, 
and the plaintiffs raised the substantive ar-
gument as part of a purported cross-appeal. 
In so doing, the plaintiffs relied entirely on 
their claim of a timely cross-appeal and did 
not present the substantive ground as an al-
ternate ground for decision. This Court re-
versed the trial court's ruling on the proce-
dural issue and then considered the plaintiffs' 
cross-appeal. Henretty. 791 P.2d at 510-11. 
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Even though the plaintiffs were not seeking 
to change the outcome in the trial court, we 
refused to consider the substantive argument 
because the cross-appeal had not been timely 
filed. 
Sandstrom was a procedurally complex 
workers' compensation case. In short, the 
issue on writ of review to this Court was 
whether the Second Injury Fund was re-
quired to provide reimbursement to the 
State Insurance Fund for certain payments 
the latter had made to Sandstrom. The In-
dustrial Commission, affirming an admin-
istrative law judge's decision, ruled that the 
Second Injury Fund was not liable for 
reimbursement. On review before this 
Court, the Industrial Commission was 
joined as a defendant. We reversed. 
Sandstrom, 689 P.2d at 3-4. In so doing, 
we refused to consider the Industrial 
Commission's statute of limitations argu-
ment, which it offered as an alternate 
ground for affirming its decision. Howev-
er, the Second Injury Fund never offered 
that argument on its own behalf, and we 
held that failure to present it below con-
stituted waiver. Id. at 4. In dicta, we then 
stated that the issue could not have been 
raised without a cross-appeal. Id. Thus, 
both Henretty and Sandstrom adopted 
holdings primarily based on the failure of 
the appropriate party to raise an argument 
at the appropriate time rather than on this 
Court's ability to address arguments re-
jected by a lower adjudicator. 
To the extent those cases suggested the 
necessity of a cross-appeal or a 
cross-petition where an argument is raised 
and rejected below and no change to the 
judgment is sought, we disavow that im-
plication. 
*357 The Court of Appeals ruled that because 
"defendants in this case are challenging the legality of 
the warrantless search-a question quite different than 
the validity of the warrant," the State was raising an 
argument that was not "related to the ruling being 
appealed." South, 885 P.2d at 798. The Court of Ap-
peals thus apparently presumed that the trial court's 
rulings on the "plain smell" issue and the validity of 
the warrant constituted distinct judgments or decisions 
and the Langnes doctrine therefore could not apply. 
[31 [4] We disagree. The Court of Appeals' rea-
soning simply becomes mired in the semantics of what 
it labels a "ruling" as opposed to a "ground" for deci-
sion. " 'Failure to observe the distinction between a 
contention, argument, or theory, on the one hand, and 
a claim on the other, is responsible for much of the 
confusion in the cases on the subject of the necessity 
for cross-appeals.' " Robert L. Stern et al., Supreme 
Court Practice 767 (quoting 9 James W. Moore & 
Bernard J. Ward, Moore's Federal Practice f 
204.11[3], at 934 (1973)). In determining what con-
stitutes a separate ground for decision, it is not the 
applied terminology that is important, but rather the 
substance of the trial court's decision. Langnes. 282 
U.S. at 538-39, 51 S.Ct. at 246. A judgment or deci-
sion ^ may be based on any number of subsidiary 
rulings or grounds, but as long as that judgment or 
decision produces a distinct and tangible result, it is 
only the result which requires an appeal, a 
cross-appeal, a petition for certiorari, or a 
cross-petition. w Id. In short, it is the outcome upon 
which the focus must be brought to bear, not the rea-
soning employed to reach the outcome. 
FN6. The flexibility of these terms, depend-
ing upon the legal context, does indeed pro-
duce a certain degree of confusion. The term 
"judgment," for instance, has been employed 
variously to describe interlocutory decisions, 
verdicts, and verdicts accompanied by rem-
edies or punishments. It thus becomes all the 
more important to focus on the rationale be-
hind the governing rule rather than according 
any talismanic significance to the words 
employed. 
FN7. Of course we do not here imply that the 
Langnes doctrine in any way restricts our 
discretionary power, when we grant a peti-
tion for certiorari, to limit the issues that will 
be treated. 
In this regard, it is helpful to examine the result 
that each party was seeking in this case. The Souths 
desired suppression of the evidence, and the State 
desired that the evidence be admitted. To prevail, the 
Souths had to convince the trial court to reject all the 
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State's potential justifications for the search. The 
State, on the other hand, needed only to demonstrate 
one valid, independently supportable justification for 
the search. As a practical matter, it was of little con-
sequence to either the Souths or the State that the trial 
court rejected the warrant argument but accepted the 
"plain smell" argument, rather than the other way 
around. The result was the same, and in responding to 
the Souths' appeal, the State was not seeking to change 
it. The State merely offered another line of reasoning 
which, if accepted, would result in precisely the same 
outcome as that originally granted by the trial court: 
admission of the contested evidence. 
We therefore reverse and remand to the Court of 
Appeals for consideration of the State's proffered 
alternative ground for affirming the trial court's ruling. 
ZIMMERMAN, C.J., HOWE. DURHAM and 
RUSSON. JJ„ concur. 
Utah, 1996. 
State v. South 
924 P.2d 354 
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